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Abstract
Linnebo and Pettigrew (Philos Q 64:267–283, 2014) have recently developed a 
version of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstrac-
tion principles. They recognize that this version of structuralism is vulnerable to 
the well-known problem of non-rigid structures. This paper ofers a solution to the 
problem for this version of structuralism. The solution involves expanding the lan-
guages used to describe mathematical structures. We then argue that this solution is 
philosophically acceptable to those who endorse mathematical structuralism based 
on Fregean abstraction principles.
Mathematical structuralists who think that abstract structures exist face a problem. 
The problem comes from the existence of non-rigid structures, structures that admit 
non-trivial automorphisms. A non-trivial automorphism is an isomorphism from a 
structure to itself that is not the identity mapping; under the automorphism, there 
is an object in the structure that is not mapped to itself. Non-trivial automorphisms 
create a problem for mathematical structuralism. Some versions of structuralism 
entail that objects in a structure with exactly the same properties are identical. Non-
trivial automorphisms on a structure show that the structure has two distinct objects 
with the same properties. The structuralist is thus forced to identify objects that 
should be distinct. This is the problem of non-rigid structures.
The problem of non-rigid structures is a general problem threatening several ver-
sions of non-eliminative structuralism. It was originally developed in response to 
Stewart Shapiro’s (1997) ante rem structuralism, most notably by Burgess (1999), 
Hellman (2001) and Keränen (2001, 2006). But as Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014) 
have shown, the problem also threatens other forms of non-eliminative structural-
ism. In particular, versions of structuralism based on abstraction principles are 
afected by the problem of non-rigid structures.
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This paper ofers a solution to the problem of non-rigid structures for a version 
of non-eliminative structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles. Sec-
tion 1 describes mathematical structuralism in more detail. The particular kind of 
mathematical structuralism under consideration takes mathematical structures to 
be obtained through a process of Fregean abstraction, which is the focus of Sect. 2. 
Section 3 describes the non-rigidity problem for this version of structuralism gener-
ated by the existence of non-trivial automorphisms on certain structures. Section 4 
ofers a solution to the non-rigidity problem for this version of structuralism. The 
solution trades on removing the non-trivial automorphisms by introducing a col-
lection of distinguished predicates into the languages that describe these structures. 
The concluding section  5 ofers a philosophical justiication for introducing these 
distinguished predicates in order to solve the problem of non-rigid structures.
1  Mathematical Structuralism
Structuralists argue that mathematics is not primarily about mathematical objects, 
like numbers, points, and sets.1 Mathematics is more concerned with the structures 
that these objects form, like the ield of real numbers, the Euclidean plane, and the 
cumulative hierarchy of sets, as well as the mathematical theories that describe these 
structures. The theory of real analysis, for example, does not focus on the individual 
real numbers in isolation; real analysis focuses on the relations between real num-
bers, i.e., the structure that the real numbers exhibit.
Structuralist views can be roughly divided into two camps: eliminative and non-
eliminative. Non-eliminative structuralists argue that there is a single abstract struc-
ture that, e.g., real analysis is about. This is the structure exhibited by any com-
plete ordered ield, with the appropriate interpretation of the relations on this ield. 
Real numbers are understood as positions in this unique abstract structure. Similarly, 
other mathematical theories concern other unique abstract structures, where the rele-
vant mathematical objects are positions in those structures. These positions serve as 
the unique referents for singular mathematical terms. Eliminative structuralists, on 
the other hand, deny the existence of unique abstract structures, arguing that claims 
about the real number structure should be understood in terms of quantiication over 
all complete ordered ields. This paper focuses on a particular version of non-elimi-
native structuralism.
Borrowing terminology from the literature on universals, some have applied the 
terms ante rem and in re to, respectively, the non-eliminative and eliminative char-
acterizations of structuralism. However, we adopt a more ine-grained application of 
this terminology, which can be found in Shapiro (2018, §1).
Any of the usual array of philosophical views on universals can be adapted to 
structures. One can be a Platonic ante rem realist, holding that each structure 
exists and has its properties independent of any systems that have that struc-
1 In what follows, I use the term ‘structuralism’ and its cognates to refer to mathematical structuralism.
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ture. On this view, structures exist objectively, and are ontologically prior to 
any systems that have them (or at least ontologically independent of such sys-
tems). Or one can be an Aristotelian in re realist, holding that structures exist, 
but insisting that they are ontologically posterior to the systems that instantiate 
them. Destroy all the natural number systems and, alas, you have destroyed the 
natural number structure itself. A third option is to deny that structures exist 
at all. Talk of structures is just a convenient shorthand for talk of systems that 
have a certain similarity.
On the ine-grained classiication, ante rem and in re structuralism are both versions 
of non-eliminative structuralism, as both views hold that there exists some (abstract) 
entity that is, e.g., the structure of the reals. The diference between ante rem and in 
re structuralism lies in the relationship between an abstract structure and the realiza-
tions of that structure, i.e., the systems that exhibit the structure.
Consider the ield of real numbers, which according to the non-eliminative struc-
turalist is a unique abstract structure. This structure has multiple set-theoretic reali-
zations, including the set of all equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of ration-
als, and the set of Dedekind cuts of the rationals.2 Neither set is the abstract structure 
of the real number ield. Rather, each set is a system or realization that exhibits this 
abstract structure.
The diference between ante rem and in re non-eliminative structuralism con-
cerns the relationship between an abstract structure and the systems exhibiting that 
structure. The in re structuralist argues that the existence of an abstract structure 
depends, in some sense, on the existence of some system or other that exhibits the 
structure in question. The ante rem structuralist denies that any such dependence 
between structures and systems holds.3 One of the main tasks of non-eliminative 
structuralism is to articulate this dependence claim in order to make the distinction 
between ante rem and in re structuralism precise, as is discussed in Linnebo (2008) 
and Wigglesworth (2018).
Though the problem of non-rigid structures threatens both ante rem and in re 
structuralism, this paper addresses the problem only for a speciic version of in 
re structuralism. According to this version of in re structuralism, which we call 
abstraction-based structuralism, abstract structures are obtained through a pro-
cess of Fregean abstraction. This version of structuralism has recently been articu-
lated and criticized by Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014).4 Their criticism speciically 
points to the fact that abstraction-based structuralism falls victim to the problem of 
2 More precisely, the structure of the real number ield is realized by systems that take one or the other 
of these sets as a domain, and include appropriate distinguished relations on the domain.
3 For the ante rem structuralist, the existence of abstract structures is usually given axiomatically. See, 
e.g, Shapiro (1997) or Leitgeb (2014).
4 Linnebo and Pettigrew do not explicitly discuss this theory of abstract structures as an in re version 
of structuralism, though this is a natural interpretation based on the details of the theory. However, it is 
certainly a non-eliminative version of structuralism, and whether it is ante rem or in re is not particularly 
important for the remainder of the paper.
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non-rigid structures. By performing Fregean abstraction on a system of objects, we 
arrive at an abstract structure. But sometimes the abstraction process results in a 
mismatch between the system and the structure. The abstraction-based structuralist 
is forced to regard certain positions in a structure as identical, while the objects that 
correspond to those positions are distinct in the system from which the structure is 
abstracted. In the next section, we outline the details of Fregean abstraction and the 
abstraction-based structuralist position, following closely the account as given by 
Linnebo and Pettigrew. Section 3 develops the problem of non-rigid structures for 
abstraction-based structuralism, and Sect. 4 proposes a solution to this problem spe-
ciically for this version of structuralism.
2  Abstraction‑Based Structuralism
Those familiar with contemporary philosophy of mathematics will recognize 
Fregean abstraction principles. Abstraction principles introduce identity condi-
tions for abstract objects by appealing to equivalence relations. In this way Frege 
(1968, §64) introduced identity conditions for the directions of lines by appealing to 
the equivalence relation of two lines being parallel: the direction of line a is identi-
cal to the direction of line b if a is parallel to b.
Identity conditions for abstract structures can also be given with a Fregean 
abstraction principle that appeals to an equivalence relation on systems of objects. 
Deine a system S = ⟨DS, RS
1
,… , RS
n
⟩ to be an ordered tuple that includes a domain 
D
S of objects and a number of distinguished relations RS
1
,… , RS
n
 on the domain. The 
distinguished relations may include one-place relations, i.e., monadic properties. 
Systems may also include distinguished elements of the domain and distinguished 
functions on the domain. For simplicity, we focus on purely relational systems, 
though nothing turns on this restriction. An isomorphism between two systems is 
a relation-preserving bijective mapping between the objects in the domains of each 
system.5 The isomorphism relation between systems is an equivalence relation, so 
we can use it to provide identity conditions for abstract structures with a Fregean 
abstraction principle. Letting [S] refer to the structure of system S, we have:
That is, the structure of S is identical to the structure of S′ if S is isomorphic to 
S
′
.
6 Given a system S, we say that [S] is the pure structure of S, and that S exhib-
its the structure [S]. It is desirable that [S] be like S in certain ways. In particular, 
it is desirable that, for all S, [S] ≅ S . We will see, however, that abstraction-based 
structuralism does not allow for this isomorphism to hold in all cases. In particular, 
[S] = [S�] ↔ S ≅ S�
5 This characterization of isomorphism will be made more precise in Sect. 4.
6 Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014, p. 274) note that this abstraction principle can lead to the Burali-Forti 
paradox. As they suggest, one can avoid paradox by taking systems to be sets and abstractions to be sui 
generis mathematical objects.
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systems that admit non-trivial automorphisms may not be isomorphic to their own 
pure structures.
Given that we can compare systems with their pure structures, for instance to 
check whether the two are isomorphic, pure structures should also consist of a 
domain and distinguished relations on the domain. The domain contains elements, 
which we call ‘positions’ in the structure. The positions in the domain of a pure 
structure, and the relations between these positions, should in some sense match 
up with the objects and relations composing the systems that exhibit the pure 
structure in question. Like pure structures, positions in structures are also obtained 
through Fregean abstraction. When an object x belongs to the domain of a system 
S, let [x]
S
 be the corresponding position in [S]. Identity conditions for positions in 
structures are given by the following abstraction principle:
Two positions in a structure are identical if their corresponding objects are mapped 
to each other under an isomorphism. In particular, if S = S� , then f is an automor-
phism, and any two objects in S that instantiate exactly the same distinguished rela-
tions can be mapped to the same position in the abstract structure [S]. This abstrac-
tion principle is what generates the non-rigidity problem, because there are systems 
that contain distinct objects satisfying all of the same distinguished relations in the 
system.
Despite being vulnerable to the non-rigidity problem, abstraction-based struc-
turalism is a powerful theory of abstract structures. If one only focuses on rigid 
systems, such as the standard speciications of the systems of the natural num-
bers and the real numbers, then abstraction-based structuralism is an attractive and 
successful theory. In particular, it can prove that each rigid system has a unique 
pure structure, and that each system is isomorphic to its pure structure. It also 
allows for a principled distinction between structural and non-structural properties 
and relations.7 This success makes it a strong competitor to other versions of non-
eliminative structuralism, like Shapiro’s ante rem structuralism. A solution to the 
problem of non-rigid structures for abstraction-based structuralism would make 
the theory even stronger.
3  Non‑rigid Structures
Non-rigid structures, or in the present context non-rigid systems, are systems that 
admit at least one non-trivial automorphism, an isomorphism, f, from the system 
to itself that is not the identity mapping; for some x in the domain of the system, 
f (x) ≠ x . The problem that non-rigid systems present for abstraction-based struc-
turalism can be seen by way of a simple example. Consider the following system, 
explicitly described by Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014, p. 276).
[x]S = [x
�]S� ↔ ∃f (f ∶ S ≅ S
� ∧ f (x) = x�)
G = ⟨DG = {n, m}, RG = {⟨n, m⟩, ⟨m, n⟩}⟩
7 See Linnebo and Pettigrew (2014, pp. 276–277), as well as Schiemer and Wigglesworth (2018).
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The system has two objects in its domain and a single symmetric and irrelexive dis-
tinguished relation that holds between them. The system can be visually represented 
as a simple graph with two nodes and two directed edges (Fig. 1).
In the system G we have RG(n, m) and RG(m, n) . There is a mapping f from G to 
itself such that f (n) = m and f (m) = n . Because RG(n, m) , we have RG(f (m), f (n)) ; 
and similarly because RG(m, n) , we have RG(f (n), f (m)) . It follows that f ∶ G ≅ G 
is an automorphism. But n ≠ m , so f is non-trivial. The graph makes the existence 
of a non-trivial automorphism clear: permuting the two objects results in a graph 
with the same structure as the original.
In the system G and its pure structure [G], we see the non-rigidity problem 
concretely. The existence of the automorphism f on the system G, when combined 
with the abstraction principle for positions in a structure, entails that the posi-
tions [n]
G
 and [m]
G
 in the pure structure [G] are identical; but in the system G, the 
objects n and m are not identical. The mismatch between objects in G and posi-
tions in [G] further entails that [G] ≇ G.
The full force of the non-rigidity problem is apparent when considering more 
familiar mathematical systems that admit non-trivial automorphisms. The two 
node symmetric graph is not particularly noteworthy, mathematically speaking. 
But there are many non-rigid systems of mathematical interest. Standard exam-
ples discussed in the literature on mathematical structuralism include the com-
plex ield, under the automorphism that maps each complex number a + bi to its 
conjugate a − bi . According to the abstraction principle for positions in struc-
tures, it follows that for all a and b, a + bi = a − bi , and in particular i = −i . The 
integers considered as a group under addition has a non-trivial automorphism 
that maps each number n to − n . If these cases weren’t bad enough, consider 
the Euclidean plane. For any two points, x, y, in the Euclidean plane, there is an 
automorphism that maps x to y. Abstraction-based structuralism would therefore 
collapse all of the positions in the structure of the Euclidean plane to a single 
point.
As a theory of structures, abstraction-based structuralism is simple, elegant, 
and highly successful when restricted to rigid systems. Unfortunately, as we have 
seen, it fails signiicantly for non-rigid structures. But the idea that pure math-
ematical structures are the result of abstracting away mathematically irrelevant 
properties from systems of objects is extremely natural and intuitive. Abstrac-
tion-based structuralism is a good irst attempt at formally capturing this idea. 
It also represents a viable non-eliminative alternative to Shapiro’s ante rem 
Fig. 1  System G 
n m
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structuralism. For these reasons, a general solution to the non-rigidity problem 
for abstraction-based structuralism is highly desirable.
4  A General Solution to the Non‑rigidity Problem
The general solution we propose focuses on the notions of identity and distinguisha-
bility of objects in a system. The solution has roots in some of the early ‘abstraction-
ist’ approaches to mathematical structuralism. Consider, for instance, Dedekind’s 
well-known characterization of the natural numbers in Was sind und was sollen die 
Zahlen?
If in the consideration of a simply ininite system N set in order by a trans-
formation 휙 we entirely neglect the special character of the elements; simply 
retaining their distinguishability8 and taking into account only the relations to 
one another in which they are placed by the order-setting transformation 휙 , 
then are these elements called natural numbers or ordinal numbers or sim-
ply numbers, and the base-element 1 is called the base-number of the number-
series N (1888, Def. 73).
Dedekind is here using abstraction to arrive at the pure structure of the natural num-
bers. In order for this abstraction to work, the objects in the system on which abstrac-
tion is performed must all be distinguishable from one another. The importance of 
the distinguishability of objects in a system is not unique to the natural numbers. 
The non-rigidity problem exploits an inability to distinguish between objects in par-
ticular systems. The solution to this problem should therefore focus on making those 
objects distinguishable. Once the objects in a system are distinguishable, abstraction 
on that system then results in the appropriate pure structure.
To present the solution, however, we need to be more precise in describing the 
problem.9 The problem of non-rigid systems requires that some systems admit non-
trivial automorphisms. Recall that an automorphism is an isomorphism between 
a system and itself. An isomorphism, f, is a bijective mapping from the objects in 
the domain of one system to the objects in the domain of another that ‘preserves 
relations’. So we must say what it means for an isomorphism to preserve relations. 
There is an intuitive notion of isomorphism between systems according to which f is 
a mapping from the objects and distinguished relations of one system S to, respec-
tively, the objects and distinguished relations of another system S′ , such that for any 
objects, x, y,… , and relation RS , of system S, RS holds between x, y,… in S if and 
only if f (RS) holds between f (x), f (y),… in S′.
Unfortunately, this characterization of isomorphism is not pre-
cise enough to always determine whether or not an isomor-
phism holds between systems. Consider the following example, from 
8 Emphasis added; subsequent emphases are original.
9 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful discussion of this point.
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Halvorson (2016,  p. 593). Let S = ⟨DS = {a, b, ⟨a, a⟩}, RS = {⟨a, a⟩}⟩ , and let 
S� = ⟨DS
�
= {a, b, ⟨a, b⟩}, RS
�
= {⟨a, b⟩}⟩ . The question of whether these systems 
are isomorphic is underdetermined. The answer depends on if the distinguished rela-
tions in these systems are one-place relations (in which case yes) or two-place rela-
tions (in which case no). Furthermore, both Halvorson (2013) and Glymour (2013) 
regard this characterization of isomorphism to be incoherent, because it allows ele-
mentarily inequivalent models to be isomorphic.
But the standard deinition of isomorphism, familiar from model theory, is per-
fectly coherent. And because systems are similar to models, we can use the standard 
deinition to determine whether S and S′ in the example above are isomorphic. This 
deinition appeals to the notion of a formal language, or signature. Two models with 
the same signature are isomorphic when there is a bijection between the domains 
of the models that preserves ‘corresponding’ relations. Corresponding relations are 
relations that serve as the interpretation of the same relation symbol in the given 
signature. In Halvorson’s example, S and S′ are then isomorphic if RS and RS
′
 serve 
as the interpretation of a one-place predicate symbol in the relevant signature. If, on 
the other hand, they serve as the interpretation of a two-place predicate symbol, then 
the systems are not isomorphic.
According to the model-theoretic deinition, when an isomorphism under con-
sideration is an automorphism, the interpretation of the relations (and of the other 
symbols in the signature) remains ixed. In other words, when the isomorphism is 
an automorphism, corresponding relations are identical. The problem of non-rigid 
systems, which turns on the existence of non-trivial automorphisms on a system, can 
be recast in this model-theoretic framework.
To make the notion of isomorphism precise, let ℒ be a signature with a set of 
primitive relation symbols.10 An ℒ-system is an interpretation  = ⟨D , v⟩ , com-
prising a domain and an assignment function that maps each m-place relation sym-
bol, R, to a set R of m-tuples of elements of the domain. Given a signature ℒ , 
an isomorphism is a relation between ℒ-systems. Two ℒ-systems,  = ⟨D , v⟩ 
and  = ⟨D , v ⟩ are isomorphic if there is a bijection f ∶ D → D  such that, 
for all x1,… , xm ∈ D
 , if R is an m-place relation symbol, ⟨x1,… , xm⟩ ∈ R
 if 
⟨f (x1),… , f (xm)⟩ ∈ R
  . The isomorphism is an automorphism when  =  .
According to this deinition, the relation of being isomorphic is something that 
holds between ℒ-systems (as opposed to systems). According to abstraction-based 
structuralism, identity conditions for pure structures are given to us through an 
abstraction principle, which involves the isomorphism relation on the right hand 
side. Given the diiculties with the notion of isomorphism as it applies to systems, it 
is more appropriate that, for abstraction-based structuralism, pure structures should 
be understood as being abstracted from ℒ-systems: two ℒ-systems have the same 
pure structure if and only if they are isomorphic.
[] = [ ]↔  ≅ 
10 What follows are standard model-theoretic deinitions. As before, we consider relational ℒ-systems, 
though one could also use interpretations to assign values to constants and function symbols in a signa-
ture.
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Recall that abstraction-based structuralism appeals to a second abstraction principle 
to determine the identity conditions for positions in pure structures. Given some ele-
ment x ∈ D , let [x]

 be the corresponding position in [] . Two objects in ℒ-sys-
tems have the same position when there is an isomorphism between the systems that 
maps one to the other.
Understanding isomorphism as a relation between ℒ-systems, and using the 
standard, model-theoretic deinition of isomorphism, one can restate the problem 
of non-rigid systems in these terms. Starting with the two node symmetric graph 
G = ⟨DG = {n, m}, RG = {⟨n, m⟩, ⟨m, n⟩}⟩ , consider the ℒ-system  = ⟨DG, v⟩ 
that maps the binary relation symbol R ∈ℒ to the set of ordered pairs RG . Under 
the mapping f ∶ DG → DG , such that f (n) = m and f (m) = n , we see that for all 
x, y ∈ DG, ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ RG if ⟨f (x), f (y)⟩ ∈ RG . So f is an automorphism, and it is non-
trivial, as n ≠ m.
The solution to the problem of non-rigid systems, or more precisely non-rigid ℒ
-systems, focuses on preserving the distinguishability of the objects in the ℒ-sys-
tems that serve as the basis for abstraction. This kind of solution has been explored 
by some who are interested in the non-rigidity problem as it applies to ante rem 
structuralism. Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008) suggest that the identity and non-iden-
tity relations can be included as distinguished relations in the speciication of a 
system.
We conclude that the identity relation for positions in a structure is a relation 
that ought to be viewed as an integral component of a structure in the same 
way as, for example, the successor relation is an integral component of the 
structure of natural numbers (p. 390).
Adapting the structuralist slogan on natural numbers ... we are still allowed to 
say that ‘There is no more to the individual [positions] “in themselves” than 
the relations they bear to each other’, the only addition that we have to make 
is that we have to count identity and diference of [positions] among the very 
relations that the [positions] in a [structure] bear to each other (pp. 392–393).
Leitgeb and Ladyman argue that the identity or diference of positions in a structure 
should be given by the structure itself, and so the relations of identity and non-iden-
tity should be included as essential parts of a system.
Their proposal suggests an approach to the non-rigidity problem for abstrac-
tion-based structuralism, a possible strategy to rigidify non-rigid ℒ-systems. If 
one were dealing with systems, as opposed to ℒ-systems, one could adopt Leitgeb 
and Ladyman’s approach by expanding a system S = ⟨DS, RS
1
,… , RS
n
⟩ to a system 
S
�
= ⟨DS, RS
1
,… , RS
n
, IS, NS⟩ , which includes the identity and non-identity relations 
on the domain. Such an expansion would make these relations distinguished, if they 
were not distinguished already. One could then abstract on the expanded system S′ 
to obtain the pure structure of S. It isn’t hard to see, however, that adding the iden-
tity and non-identity relations will not remove any non-trivial automorphisms. Both 
[x] = [y] ↔ ∃f (f ∶  ≅  ∧ f (x) = y)
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relations are symmetric, and so any non-trivial automorphism on S is a non-trivial 
automorphism on S′ , as the relations would not enable one to distinguish between 
previously indistinguishable objects.
Adapting this approach for ℒ-systems, one would expand a signature with new 
distinguished predicates, rather than expanding a system with new distinguished 
relations. But identity and non-identity are usually already included in the logical 
part of the languages used to describe ℒ-systems. So any ℒ-systems that admit 
non-trivial automorphisms do so despite the identity and non-identity relations 
being distinguished. If for some reason identity and non-identity are not included in 
the logical part of a language used to describe an ℒ-systems, adding them will not 
help. As before, the relations are symmetric, so they do not allow one to make new 
distinctions between objects that were previously indistinguishable.
Focusing on the identity and non-identity relations, as Leitgeb and Ladyman sug-
gest, does not yield a solution to the non-rigidity problem for abstraction-based 
structuralism. However, there is another way to ensure that all objects in an ℒ-sys-
tem are distinguishable. If one were dealing with systems, as opposed to ℒ-systems, 
one could expand a system S = ⟨DS, RS
1
,… , RS
n
⟩ to a system 
S
∗
= ⟨DS, RS
1
,… , RS
n
, PS
x1
,… , PS
x
m
⟩ , which includes a one-place relation (i.e., a prop-
erty) for each distinct object in the domain. As we are working in the context of ℒ
-systems, however, the analogous approach adds one-place relation symbols, 
P
x1
,… , P
x
m
 , to the relevant signature. These one-place predicates can then be inter-
preted by the singleton sets of each object in the relevant domain.
For example, recall the ℒ-system  = ⟨DG, v⟩ , which represents the two-
node symmetric graph, so that DG = {n, m} , and the assignment function v 
maps the non-logical binary relation symbol R ∈ℒ to the set of ordered pairs 
R
G = {⟨n, m⟩, ⟨m, n⟩} . This ℒ-system admits a non-trivial automorphism f that per-
mutes n and m. To remove the non-trivial automorphism on the ℒ-system  , let 
∗ = ⟨DG, v
∗
⟩ be an ℒ∗-system, where ℒ∗ ⊇ℒ adds one-place relation symbols 
P
n
 and P
m
 to ℒ , one relation symbol for each element of DG . The ℒ∗-system ∗ 
is a signature expansion of the ℒ-system  . The assignment function v
∗
 maps the 
two-place predicate R as before, and maps the new one-place predicates, P
n
 and P
m
 , 
to {n} and {m} , respectively. The mapping, f, which permutes n and m, is no longer 
an automorphism, because the biconditionals n ∈ {n} if f (n) ∈ {n} and m ∈ {m} 
if f (m) ∈ {m} do not hold. In fact, there are no non-trivial automorphisms on the 
expanded ℒ∗-system ∗ ; the only automorphism on this ℒ∗-system is the identity 
mapping.
Generally, all that is required for this solution to work is that for every distinct 
object, x, in the domain of an ℒ-system  , there is a one-place relation symbol P
x
 
in the signature of ℒ∗-system ∗ , where ∗ is a signature expansion of  . Call these 
predicates identity predicates, as the assignment function v
∗
 maps each P
x
 to {x} , 
which is extensionally identical to the property being identical to x. Call a signa-
ture expansion of an ℒ-system that (only) adds identity predicates to the signature, 
mapping each new identity predicate to the appropriate singleton set, an identity 
expansion.
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Once an ℒ-system  is expanded to an ℒ∗-system ∗ , all objects in the ℒ∗-sys-
tem are distinguishable because each object can be picked out by its unique identity 
predicate, a predicate that isn’t satisied by any other object. In this way, the pro-
posal allows for a solution to the non-rigidity problem for abstraction-based struc-
turalism, when the relevant abstraction principles are applied to ℒ-systems, rather 
than systems detached from a signature.
One might worry that this introduces a ‘language relativity’ into the notion of 
pure mathematical structure. However, it seems that this appeal to language may be 
required, given the arguable incoherence, or at least indeterminacy, of the intuitive, 
language-independent, notion of isomorphism. Furthermore, mathematical struc-
tures are generally understood and explored in the context of a mathematical theory, 
given in terms of a speciied signature. For example, we think of the natural number 
structure, and the relations between natural numbers such as ‘less than’, in terms of 
the signature, or language, of Peano arithmetic. For purposes of this paper, then, 
we assume that pure mathematical structures are characterized relative to a given 
signature.
There is an alternative presentation of this solution, which captures the main idea 
in a slightly diferent way. Instead of expanding an ℒ-system with one-place predicate 
symbols, we could expand it with constants, one for each object in the domain. As long 
as identity is included in the logical part of the relevant language, both presentations 
solve the abstraction-based structuralist’s non-rigidity problem. One might think that 
whether one presentation is preferable to the other boils down to how one feels, in the 
spirit of Quine (1951), about ontology versus ideology. One can add more objects or 
add more relations to the speciication of a system. But it is important to keep in mind 
for the present context that in neither case is anything really being added. Any new 
constant refers to an object that is already in the ℒ-system’s domain, and has been all 
along. And any new predicate refers to a relation that holds whether we specify it or 
not. The only thing that is changing is the language used to describe the system.
It should be noted that neither presentation of this solution solves all of the 
abstraction-based structuralist’s problems. In discussing models of complex analy-
sis, Shapiro (2012, p. 383) notes that adding a constant symbol i (or equivalently, 
an identity predicate that only i satisies) to the language of complex analysis, with 
the axiom i2 = −1 , makes the system rigid. Adding the constant i entails that there 
will be a distinguished object that is the referent of i. Though this addition makes the 
system rigid, it does not determine which of the two square roots of −1 the constant i 
refers to. The system where i refers to one square root and not the other is equivalent 
to the system that switches the referents around. In this sense the two square roots 
of −1 are indistinguishable. While this is an issue the abstraction-based structural-
ist may be concerned with, especially when considering the relationship between 
the language of complex analysis and the system of complex numbers, it is not the 
speciic problem that we are attempting to solve here. After all, adding a constant 
symbol, or an identity predicate, makes the model rigid. And this is our primary 
concern.
With the proposed solution in hand, for each ℒ-system  , there is an expanded 
ℒ∗-system ∗ that gives rise to the intended pure structure of  through Fregean 
abstraction. For the abstraction-based structuralist, the process of Fregean 
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abstraction is perhaps best understood as a two-step process. The irst step takes 
one from an ℒ-system  to the expanded ℒ∗-system ∗ . It may be that ℒ already 
includes identity predicates for all of the objects in the domain of  . If v maps 
these identity predicates in the appropriate way, then  = ∗ . But usually ∗ is a 
proper signature expansion of  . After the irst step of moving to an expanded ℒ∗
-system, the second step uses abstraction to obtain [∗] , which is the intended pure 
structure of .
Arguably, abstraction on expanded ℒ∗-systems is a plausible rational reconstruc-
tion of mathematical practice. First ix the identity and distinctness of objects in the 
relevant ℒ-system by expanding it to an ℒ∗-system, then use Fregean abstraction 
to obtain the pure structure of that ℒ∗-system. When analysts talk about the struc-
ture of the complex numbers, they know what the target is. They are talking about 
a structure where i and −i are distinguishable. There are certainly pure structures, 
obtained through Fregean abstraction on certain ℒ-systems, that identify (what 
those systems call) i with −i . But these structures are not the intended pure structure 
of the complex numbers. If the structure of the complex numbers is to be obtained 
through Fregean abstraction on an ℒ-system, then the distinguishability of i and − i 
must be given by the ℒ-system already, so that it can then be preserved in the pure 
structure.
So this solution to the problem of non-rigid structures is a possible description of 
how intended mathematical structures are in practice (perhaps implicitly) obtained 
through Fregean abstraction. It may not be the only solution. It would be nice for the 
abstraction-based structuralist to have some way of avoiding the non-rigidity prob-
lem without inlating the signatures of ℒ-systems to include identity predicates for 
all of the objects in its domain. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. But at 
least non-eliminative structuralists appealing to Fregean abstraction have one solu-
tion to the problem of non-rigid structures. The important question is whether this 
solution is philosophically acceptable. The next section argues that it is.
5  The Philosophical Acceptability of Identity Predicates
What justiies adding individual identity predicates to the signature of an ℒ-system? 
That depends, in part, on what justiies adding any predicate to the signature of an 
ℒ-system. Generally, relation symbols in a signature ℒ are supposed to pick out 
relations on the domain of ℒ-systems. But there are no speciic restrictions on the 
relations that these predicates can refer to, other than that they should match in arity, 
so that one-place relation symbols pick out one-place relations (singletons), two-
place relation symbols pick out two-place relations (ordered pairs), etc. Given any 
ℒ-system  , there doesn’t seem to be anything stopping us from adding an identity 
predicate to ℒ for each object in D . An identity predicate P
x
 picks out a property, 
which we may call the identity property, being identical to x, or at least one that is 
extensionally identical to that property.
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However, our ability to pinpoint an identity expansion of an ℒ-system, in order 
to arrive at that ℒ-system’s pure structure through abstraction, raises more general 
questions about whether and how we can choose which ℒ-system to abstract from.11 
This question is particularly relevant when one is interested in inding the pure 
structure described by a particular mathematical theory, like number theory or com-
plex analysis. The abstraction-based structuralist argues that mathematical theories 
describe pure structures. These structures are obtained through a process of abstrac-
tion on particular ℒ-systems, where ℒ is the language of the relevant theory. But 
whether or not we arrive at the appropriate pure structure for the theory in question 
depends on the ℒ-system that serves as the basis for abstraction.
Unfortunately, for a given theory, there are often many systems to choose from. 
ℒ-systems are models, and in a irst-order setting, many theories have a large num-
ber of models that are not isomorphic to one another. The existence of these mod-
els follows from the (upward) Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, which says that every 
countable irst-order theory with an ininite model has a model of every ininite size. 
For example, the irst-order theory of the natural numbers has a model of every ini-
nite size, because it has a model—the standard model—which is countably ininite. 
Abstracting on these diferent models of number theory will lead to pure structures 
that are not isomorphic to one another. So how do we choose which ℒ-system to 
abstract from in order to ensure that we arrive at the structure of the natural num-
bers, the intended pure structure that number theory describes? Similar questions 
arise for other mathematical theories of interest, so we need a general strategy for 
making this choice.
A plausible strategy, in the irst-order setting, may be to choose the standard 
model of the theory in question.12 If we are able to choose the basis for abstraction, 
surely the standard model of a theory will lead us to the appropriate pure structure 
that the theory describes. This strategy is reasonable, because for many mathemati-
cal theories of interest, the standard model of the theory is rigid. This holds for the 
standard model of number theory, as well as for the standard model of real analysis. 
Choosing either of these ℒ-systems as the basis for abstraction results in the appro-
priate pure structure of the theory in question.
But not all standard models are rigid. The standard model for complex analysis 
is not. Performing abstraction on this non-rigid ℒ-system yields a pure structure 
that is not isomorphic to the original ℒ-system, as it identiies each complex num-
ber with its conjugate. So choosing the standard model of a mathematical theory as 
the basis for abstraction does not always work. It cannot be the general strategy for 
choosing ℒ-systems to abstract from, because it won’t always deliver the pure struc-
ture of the theory in question.
But it is a good start. Focusing on the standard model of a theory, the abstrac-
tion-based structuralist can use considerations from Sect. 4 to ind a rigid, expanded 
ℒ∗-system able to serve as the basis for abstraction in order to arrive at the pure 
structure of the theory in question. In the case of complex analysis, start with the 
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of this point.
12 For the second-order case, if the theory in question is categorical, then any model will do.
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theory’s standard model, which is non-rigid, and expand the signature of the theory 
with identity predicates for each object in the domain, ensuring that the valuation 
function of the expanded ℒ∗-system maps each identity predicate appropriately. 
Abstracting on the expanded ℒ∗-system results in the pure structure of the complex 
numbers. The strategy can be generalized, because for any particular ℒ-system, one 
can expand ℒ with identity predicates, one for each object in the system’s domain. 
Abstracting on the expanded ℒ∗-system results in the pure structure of the original 
ℒ-system. If one is interested in the pure structure of a particular mathematical the-
ory, start with the standard model of the theory (or an ℒ-system that is isomorphic 
to the standard model) and expand the signature with identity predicates for each 
object in the domain. Once the model has been expanded, abstract on the expanded 
model to arrive at the intended pure structure of the theory in question.
Because this general strategy appeals to identity predicates, which refer to iden-
tity properties, it is appropriate to address one further concern as to whether these 
properties are controversial on metaphysical grounds. Identity properties are very 
similar to other kinds of properties known as haecceities. Haecceities, like identity 
properties, are also properties that are instantiated by exactly one object. Let H
x
 
represent the haecceity of an object x in ℒ-system  . Because of the nature of haec-
ceities, it follows that for all y, y ∈ H
x
↔ y = x . Of course, this biconditional also 
holds for x’s identity property. What this shows is that identity properties and haec-
ceities have the same extension. But it does not show that they are the same thing.
Haecceities are usually connected to more controversial metaphysical notions like 
essences or thisnesses. We are not arguing that any of these metaphysical connec-
tions hold for identity properties. The identity property of an object is simply a prop-
erty that it and it alone possesses, nothing more. So identity properties shouldn’t be 
controversial for any similarities they may bear to haecceities. But they shouldn’t 
be particularly controversial for any other metaphysical reason. Pure structures are 
obtained through Fregean abstraction on ℒ-systems, and ℒ-systems are understood 
set-theoretically. Set-theoretically, identity properties are basic and quite unproblem-
atic; they are simply singletons of the elements of the domain.
Since there do not appear to be any speciic criteria that predicates must satisfy in 
order to be added to the signature of an ℒ-system, identity predicates are fair game. 
If these predicates are included, and mapped appropriately to identity properties, 
then the expanded ℒ∗-systems do not admit non-trivial automorphisms. Thus we 
have a general solution to the problem of non-rigid structures for abstraction-based 
structuralism, one that can be applied to any ℒ-system of objects or any theory that 
the mathematician is interested in.
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